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Abstract:
This paper assesses one of the key components of the nation’s defense against bioterrorism—the Na-
tional Strategic Stockpile. The Stockpile was created by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and Project
Bioshield in 2004, with a mandate to procure suﬃcient vaccines, medicines and other products to
avert or contain a public health crisis in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Currently, the Stock-
pile lacks critical countermeasures and next generation vaccines because they have not yet been
developed. Congress has attempted to provide the conditions necessary for the private sector to
create these products for the National Stockpile, but Congress’s eﬀorts have largely failed thus far.
This paper will examine both aspects of the National Strategic Stockpile: ﬁrst it will examine the
legislation providing for the National Strategic Stockpile and the strategy to provide the private
market with incentives to develop priority countermeasures. Second, this paper will then analyze
the strengths and weaknesses of the legislation and oﬀer recommendations for future governmental
actions to ensure the successful build-up of a robust National Strategic Stockpile.
I. Introduction: The Threat
September 11, 2001 opened the eyes of the American public to the threat of terrorism within its own
borders. Within a week of the World Trade Center attacks, an even more speciﬁc form of terrorism grabbed
the nation’s headlines: bioterrorism. 1 Anthrax-laced letters sent to Senators and members of the press
1Many were aware of the threat prior to September 11th, but they did not capture the attention of the public. See, e.g.,
1resulted in ﬁve deaths, set oﬀ a ﬂurry of F.B.I. activity, and kept Americans glued to the news outlets.2
While the sender of those letters remains a mystery,3 the potential threat of bioterrorism does not: the public
is now acutely aware of the dangers presented by a bioterrorist attack on the nation’s food,4 water,5 or drug6
supply. In response to this post-September 2001 reality, Congress quickly passed legislation designed to meet
the threat of bioterrorism.
This paper will analyze one prominent component of Congress’s legislative response7—the creation of a
strategic national stockpile of drugs, vaccines and other countermeasures critical to identifying, diagnosing,
and treating victims in the event of bioterrorism. Part II will provide an overview of the relevant provisions
Heather A. Dagen, Comment, Bioterrorism: Perfectly Legal, 49 Cath. U.L. Rev. 535, FN 1-2 (2000), for citations to the
literature discussing the threat of bioterrorism pre-September 11; Donald Wette et al., Hospital Preparedness for victims of
Chemical or Biological Terrorism, Amer. J. of Public Health, May 2001, at 710 (study ﬁnds that 4 North-east hospitals
seriously unprepared for biological attacks and out of sync with national preparedness eﬀorts); Bioterrorism: Our Frontline
Response, Evaluating U.S. Public Health and Medical Readiness: Hearings on P.L 106-505 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Health of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. (1999).
2Philip Shenon, A National Challenged: Discovery on Anthrax; Suspicious Letter to a 2nd Senator, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
2001, at A1 (Senator Leahy receives anthrax-laced letter, after Senator Daschle, NBC News and the New York Post had already
received similar letters); William J. Broad and David Johnston, Anthrax sent through mail gained potency by the letter, N.Y.
Times, May 7, 2002, at A1.
3Scott Shane, In a 4-Year Anthrax Hunt, F.B.I. Finds Itself stymied, and sued,, N.Y. Times, September 17, 2005, at A1
(F.B.I failed to identify the culprit of the 2001 anthrax letters; the F.B.I. did target persons of ¡◦interest¡± such as Dr. Steven
J. Hatﬁll, but never charged anyone with the crimes).
4See Caroline Smith Dewaal, Rising Imports, Bioterrorism and the Food Supply, 59 Food Drug L.J. 433, 436 (Secretary
of HHS, Tommy Tompson testiﬁed before Congress in 2002 that “[Food safety] is one area in which we must be more vigilant,
because disease-causing agents can easily be spread through the food supply (citing S.G. Stolberg & J. Miller, Many Worry
That Nation Is Still Highly Vulnerable to Germ Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 16)). The general need to bolster
the nation’s food security against intentional and non-intentional biological agents has been discussed elsewhere, see, e.g.,
Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React? A game plan for modernizing the food safety system in the U.S., 59 Food Drug L.J. 399
(2004)(although the food supply is not in crisis, there is a need to modernize the system to address the threat of food-borne
biological illness); Lisa Lovett, Note and Comment: Food for Thought: Consistent Protocol could strengthen food supply security
measures, 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 465 (2004).
5See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Security, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/index.cfm
(last visited on Feb. 8, 2006), for resources and information relating to the threat posed to the U.S. water supply by bioter-
rorism. See also, Victoria Sutton, Environment and Public Health in a Time of Plague, 30 Am. J. L. and Med. 217
(2004)(discussing the federal environmental law in place to address the threat of a bioterrorist attack on the water supply).
6Congress responded in part to this threat in Title III, §321-322 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (requiring annual registration of foreign manufacturers; shipping
information; drug and device information).
7This paper will assume the reader is familiar with the seriousness and potential large-scale impact of bioterrorism and
will therefore focus on Congress’s response alone. But for general background information on the nature and seriousness of
potential bioterrorism, see Gregory Koblentz, Responding to the Bioweapons Threat, p. 84, International Security (Winter
2004)(explores the security implications of pathogens used as weapons); David Koplow, That Wonderful Year: Smallpox,
Genetic Engineering, and Bioterrorism, 62 Md. L. Rev. 417 (2003)(discussing the serious nature of unconventional bioterrorism
in the context of smallpox and genetic engineering and their incorporation into the military strategy of the Soviet Union and
the United States); Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 417 (2001)(Part I explains the threat of bioterrorism and how such attacks would occur).
2requiring this national stockpile, particularly within the Bioterrorism Act of 20028 and Project BioShield
Act of 2004,9 and ﬂush out Congressional rationales for adopting these speciﬁc provisions. Part III will
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of these provisions, evaluate the stockpile-related legislation currently
pending in Congress, and oﬀer recommendations for future Congressional action.
II. The Legislation: Provisions and background
Focus upon a national stockpile of vaccines and other countermeasures gradually increased after the events of
September 2001. As the following discussion will demonstrate, Congress originally placed modest emphasis
on the national stockpile provisions in the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, but then placed signiﬁcant emphasis on
it with the passage of Project Bioshield in 2004.
A. The Bioterrorism Act of 200210
The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 [hereinafter Bioterrorism Act] represented Congress’s ﬁrst attempt to organize
a coherent national bioterrorism-security strategy. Proving that it can achieve quick results if so desired,
Congress passed the Bioterrorism Act within eight months of being introduced with bi-partisan support in
each respective chamber.11 Three broad elements deﬁne Congress’s approach in 2002:12 ﬁrst, coordinate a
8Oﬃcially titled “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,” Pub. L. No. 107-188,
116 Stat. 594.
9Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
10Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
11Senators Frist and Kennedy introduced the Senate version on November 15, 2001 (S. 1765); Representatives Tauzin (R-LA)
and Dingell (D-MI) introduced the House version on December 11, 2001 (H.R. 3448). See Stephen Redhead, Donna U. Vogt
and Mary E. Tiemann, Bioterrorism: Legislation to improve Public Health Preparedness and Response Capacity, CRS Report
RL 31263, Jan. 31, 2002, for a side by side analysis of the two bills.
12For an analysis of the ﬁrst Title I-II, see Ryan Kemper, Note: Responding to Bioterrorism: An analysis of Titles I and II of
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Reponse Act of 2002, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 385 (2005). See also
Covington & Burling report, The Food Provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, May 31, 2002; Covington & Burling report, The Drug Provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, June 12, 2002.
3coherent national response strategy in the event of bioterrorist attacks.13 Second, regulate and track dan-
gerous biological agents and toxins circulating within the United States.14 Third, enhance security of the
nation’s critical resources, including the food, drug and water supplies.15 While all three elements provide
fodder for much academic and policy debate,16 the stockpile provisions fall under the ﬁrst element of coor-
dinating a national response strategy of preparedness (Title I of the Bioterrorism Act) and will be the focus
of this paper.
Creating a coherent strategy of national preparedness presented Congress with a deep and enduring challenge
even before September 11. Warnings of the lack of coordination between local, state and federal agencies
abounded before the World Center attacks; moreover, numerous experts and interested parties exposed the
general lack of preparedness prevalent among hospitals and other front line responders.17 With this in mind,
Congress used the Title I of the Bioterrorism Act to lay out a broad and multifaceted national strategy to
respond to a bioterrorist attack. The ﬁrst prong of this strategy concentrated on coordinating local, state,
and federal agencies and addressing the disconnect between and among the levels of government.18 A second
prong focused on assisting state and local hospitals in preparing for bioterrorism or other related health
13Title I, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
14Title II, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
15Title III-IV, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
16Much has been written on the need for security of our food and water supplies in particular. See supra note 4 and 5.
See also, e.g., Matthew Boyle, A Recipe for Disaster, Fortune, p 59-60, November 14, 2005 (discussing how the National
Center for Food Protection and Defense is trying to bolster food security, and notes a recent Stanford study that found a small
amount of botulinum toxin poured into a milk tanker truck could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths); Mark Wheelis et al.,
Biological Attack on Agriculture: Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism, Bioscience, p 569, July 2002 (bioterrorist attacks on
agriculture require little expertise and U.S. agriculture is vulnerable to such attacks); Drinking-Water Security, Journal of
Environmental Health, p. 41, Sept. 2003 (since the Sept. 11, the EPA has contributed to increased security of the nation’s
water supply).
17For pre-Sept 11th warnings, see generally Bioterrorism: Our Frontline Response, Evaluating U.S. Public Health and Medical
Readiness: Hearings on P.L 106-505 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health of the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 21 (1999). For a post-Sept 11th evaluation of local preparedness, see Robin J. Strongin and
C. Stephen Redhead, Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy Forum Seminar on Federal, State, and Local
Public Health Preparedness, CRS Report RL 31225, Dec. 21, 2002.
18Title I, Subtitle A, § 101-11, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594. See generally, Victoria
Sutton, Biodefense—Who’s in Charge?, 13 Health Matrix 117 (Winter 2003)(discussing the disorganized structure of federal
agencies relating to biodefense and the need to create a coordinated national system of public surveillance and reporting);
Hearing on Federal Eﬀorts to Coordinate and Prepare the U.S. for Bioterrorism—Are they Ready? before the House Committee
on Governmental Aﬀairs, S. Hrg. 107-213, Oct. 17, 2001 (testimony on need to coordinate federal response and capacity to
assist local and state authorities in the event of bioterrorism).
4crises.19 The third prong provided for the creation of a strategic national stockpile and the development of
priority countermeasures.20
Two aspects of the national stockpile provisions in the Bioterrorism Act stand out as signiﬁcant. First, the
national stockpile provisions constitute only one of many priorities within the Bioterrorism Act, and even
within Title I itself. Arguably, Congress’s greater emphasis regarding a national response and preparedness
strategy lay in the coordination of local, state, and federal actors and bulking up the resources and prepared-
ness at the local and state level.21 Second, there are two distinct goals of the section: to compile the stockpile
(and $640 million was authorized for ﬁscal year 2002 towards this end)22 and to ensure the development and
expedited approval of priority countermeasures intended to make up the national stockpile.23 To meet the
latter goal, the Bioterrorism Act provides for “fast track” designation under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act for any priority countermeasures so designated by the Secretary of HHS and the FDA Commissioner,
allows measures to receive fast track status even if eﬀectiveness is based on animal studies,24 and provides
19§ 131, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594. States received over $1 billion for preparedness
plans in 2002. See HHS Press Release, Bioterrorism Preparedness Grants, June 6, 2002.
20Title I, Subtitle B, § 121-127, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
21A quick count of the hearings related to coordination issues as opposed to vaccines and the stockpile demonstrate this—
approximately eleven hearings were held on coordination needs between local and state governments versus ﬁve held on vaccine
R & D. See Legislative History of P.L. 107-188, 107 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 188, Hearings. Hearings held on research and
development of vaccines and other protections included: House Committee on Government Reform, Quickening the Pace of
Research in Protecting Against Anthrax and Other Biological Terrorist Agents: A Look at Toxin Interference, Feb. 28, 2002;
Hearing before the Subcom on National Security, Veterans Aﬀairs and International Relations of the House Committee on
Government Reform, Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research and Development Program, Oct. 23, 2001. The emphasis
on coordination issues is also explained by the fact that pre-September 11, the pervasive sentiment seemed to view the local and
state governments as the primary actors in any bioterrorist attack, while federal actors assisted. See, e.g., Prepared Statement
of Mr. Charles L. Cragin (Principal Undersecretary of Defense), Research and Development to support domestic emergency
preparedness for Response to Threats of Terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction before the House Armed Services
Committee, March 11, 1999.
22§121, Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594. (“The Secretary of Health and Human Services
(referred to in this section as the Secretary), in coordination with the Secretary of Veterans Aﬀairs, shall maintain a stockpile
or stockpiles of drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, and other supplies in such numbers, types, and
amounts as are determined by the Secretary to be appropriate and practicable, taking into account other available sources, to
provide for the emergency health security of the United States, including the emergency health security of children and other
vulnerable populations, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency.”)
23§ 122-125, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002.
24§ 122, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002; see Gail Javitt, Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense: Reﬁning FDA
Regulation to Promote the Availability of Products to Counter Biological Attacks, 19 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 37,
62-65 (2002)(explaining FDA rule regarding animal trials as acceptable evidentiary basis for countermeasures to bioterrrorism).
5priority funding for research institutions working on the development of priority countermeasures.25 In
short, while Congress required for the stockpile, the stockpile remained an uncertain project. Numerous
other issues occupied the attention of Congress and the creation of a stockpile remained dependent in large
part on the development of countermeasures and vaccines that could be stockpiled.
B.
Project Bioshield 200426
While the stockpile and development of countermeasures provisions represented only one of many priorities in
the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Project Bioshield focused solely on these issues. Introducing Project Bioshield
in his 2003 State of the Union speech, President Bush heralded: “[a] major research and production eﬀort to
guard our people against bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield. The budget I send you will propose almost
$6 billion to quickly make available eﬀective vaccines and treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum
toxin, Ebola, and plague. We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons, and we
must act before the dangers are upon us.”27 Towards this end, Project Bioshield honed in on the need
to further develop a comprehensive strategy to develop and procure modern vaccines and drugs capable of
protecting against future bioterrorist attacks and pledged $5.6 billion for a ten year special reserve fund to
meet this goal.28 Indeed, while treatment for many naturally-occurring diseases progressed rapidly in recent
decades, treatment for bioterrorism—such as the smallpox vaccine—have progressed very little.29
25§125, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002.
27White House Press Release, President George W. Bush State of the Union, January 28, 2003, full text available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited February 18, 2003).
28See White House Press Release, President Details Project Bioshield, Feb. 3, 2003, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html (last visited on February 18, 2006).
29See id; See also Prepared statement of Tommy G. Thompson, Hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Subcom-
mittee on Health and Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response, March 27,
2003.
6Project Bioshield entails three main components. All three components seek to prepare the nation for
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. A component signiﬁcant for the purposes of
this paper is found in the sections transferring the stockpile provisions from the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 to
Project Bioshield.30 Thus, the directive to maintain a national strategic stockpile now arises from Project
Bioshield. In addition, Project Bioshield expands on this directive by instructing the HHS Secretary, in
cooperation with the Homeland Security Secretary, to identify countermeasures appropriate to the nation’s
security but not yet available for procurement from the private sector or is available only for alternative uses.
Once identiﬁed, the Secretaries should submit for Presidential approval proposals to develop and procure
such countermeasures from the private sector with funds from the special reserve fund.31 Production and
delivery of countermeasures so targeted must be feasible within eight years of the original contract for
procurement.32 To facilitate such procurements, Project Bioshield authorizes a permanent funding source
for the Secretary to utilize when procuring private sector vaccines, drugs and treatments.33 In short, Project
Bioshield authorizes HHS and DHS to actively identify, pursue and encourage the private sector to develop
much needed vaccines and countermeasures critical to a successful national strategic stockpile.
Second, Project Bioshield seeks to spur government “countermeasure research and development.” Thus,
Project Bioshield expands on the cursory authority granted under the Bioterrorism Act to the HHS Secre-
tary to take into account contributions made to bioterrorism-related goals when awarding grants, contracts
or other funding to researchers. 34 Speciﬁcally, Project Bioshield grants the HHS Secretary and NIH Direc-
30Sec. 3(a)(1), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004) (“Transfer of program.– Section 121 of the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 611; 42 U.S.C. 300hh-12) is transferred
from such Act to the Public Health Service Act, is redesignated as section 319F-2, and is inserted after section 319F-1 of the
Public Health Service Act (as added by section 2 of this Act”).
31Sec. 3(c), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
32Sec. 3(c)(5)(A)(ii), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
33Sec. 3(f), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
34§125, “Accelerated Countermeasure Research and Development,” The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116
Stat. 594.
7tor authority to expedite procurement of cutting edge products and services necessary to facilitate research
and development, which includes the power to make procurements in non-competitive settings where neces-
sary35; to expedite peer review procedures where necessary36; and to streamline the process to contract out
for experts and consultants necessary to accelerate research and development.37 In direct contrast to the
Bioterrorism Act of 2002, Project Bioshield provides the Secretary with authority to proactively pursue and
encourage government research and development of priority countermeasures.
Project Bioshield’s third and ﬁnal main component permits the Secretary to introduce non-FDA approved
drugs, devices, or biological products into interstate commerce in the event of an actual or potential emer-
gency.38 The statute authorizes the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and/or the
Secretary of HHS to determine that an emergency or potential emergency suﬃcient to trigger these pro-
visions exists.39 Underscoring the seriousness of this scenario, Project Bioshield regulates every aspect of
an emergency situation, including the conditions of authorization, the duration of an emergency, and the
termination of an emergency.40
In sum, Project Bioshield expands upon the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and attempts to create a comprehensive
and focused strategy to develop a modernized national strategic stockpile and arsenal of eﬀective bioterrorism
countermeasures. The following analysis will focus speciﬁcally on the ﬁrst component of Project Bioshield
discussed above that authorizes the government to aggressively identify and procure priority countermeasures
35Sec. 2(b), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835. Rep. Thomas Davis, Project Bioshield: Contracting for
the Health and Security of the American Public before the House Government Reform Committee, April 4, 2003.
36Sec. 2(c), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835.
37Up to thirty experts or consultants may be hired under this section. § 2(d), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118
Stat. 835 (2004).
38Sec. 4, “Authorization for Medical Products for use in Emergency”, Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835
(2004).
39Sec. 4(b), Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
40See generally, Sec. 4, Project Bioshield, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
8from the private sector for the national strategic stockpile.
Part III. Analysis of the current provisions and guidance for future legislation
In analyzing Congress’s national strategic stockpile provisions, this section will focus on three main issues:
First, what is the current state of the national stockpile? Second, what are the strengths and witnesses of
the provisions aimed at fostering private sector research and development within the Bioterrorism Act and
Project Bioshield? Third, what actions must Congress take to ensure a successful national stockpile and
development of priority countermeasures?
A.
Current State of National Stockpile as it relates to Bioterrorism
As laid out already, the Bioterrorism Act and Project Bioshield require the creation of a national strategic
stockpile:
[the Secretary] shall maintain a stockpile or stockpiles of drugs, vaccines and other biological
products, medical devices, and other supplies.... to provide for the emergency health security
of the United States, including the emergency health security of children and other vulnerable
populations, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency.41
According to the HHS Strategic National Stockpile website, the Stockpile now contains large supplies of
medicines and medical supplies, which states will receive within 12 hours of a determination by the federal
government that a disaster exists and requires the Stockpile’s resources.42 The exact contents of the stockpile
42Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Strategic National Stockpile,
9remain classiﬁed for at least one obvious reason: full disclosure could harm the nation’s security by giving
potential terrorists information that would allow them to more eﬀectively plot a deadly attack. Instead, the
website broadly states that terrorism, earthquakes or ﬂu outbreaks could trigger use of the strategic national
stockpile.43
Despite the classiﬁed nature of the strategic national stockpile, recent reports oﬀer a relatively informative
snapshot of the stockpile’s current contents. Unfortunately, the picture leaves much to be desired. To begin,
the stockpile contains only two of ﬁfty-seven critical countermeasures as identiﬁed by the Department of
Defense.44 Such countermeasures refer to diagnostics, drugs and vaccines necessary to respond to bioterror-
ism.45 Moreover, while the stockpile does include enough smallpox vaccines to vaccinate the whole country
in an emergency,46 the vaccines currently stockpiled are essentially the same vaccines used in the 1960s.47
With the huge advancements made in science, technology and medical research over the last four decades,
such stagnation in the modernization of smallpox vaccines seems worrisome at best. Similar concerns apply
to the anthrax vaccines currently stockpiled: the anthrax vaccine presently stockpiled was licensed in 1970.48
available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/#means (last visited on February 21, 2006).
43Id.
44Mark Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Proﬁt, Washington Post, p A5, Aug. 7, 2005 (in 2000,
the DOD reported that the US had only 1 of 57 countermeasures. Five years resulted in the creation of only one more critical
countermeasure).
45Creating a BioDefense Industry: BioShield II: Hearing before the Senate Judiciary and Senate HELP Committees, Oct 6,
2004 (Testimony by Senator Joe Lieberman, D-CT)( “[in 2000, the DOD] projected that we’d have twenty of the 57 within ﬁve
years and 34 within 20 years. But, four years later, we have only two of the 57 countermeasures...At this rate of development,
we will not have 20 countermeasures available until 2076 and we will not have 34 until 2132. And this list does not even include
antibiotic resistant pathogens, hybrid pathogens, genetically modiﬁed pathogens, and a host of other exotic pathogens); cf.
Drug Problem: Biodefense, ECONOMIST, April 24, 2004(estimating 100 new diagnostics, vaccines and treatments are needed,
which could take at least 5-10 years and $50 billion).
46Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health, House Energy and
Commerce Committee and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response, House Select Homeland Security
Committee, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003)(testimony by Dr. James Baker, a physician who is the Ruth Dow Doan Professor of
Internal Medicine and Director of the Center for Biologic Nanotechnology at the University of Michigan).
47See White House Press Release, President Details Project Bioshield, Feb. 3, 2003, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html (last visited on February 18, 2006).
48One Year Later: Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Project BioShield: A Hearing before the House Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005)(comments by US Rep Henry Waxman (D-CA)(criticizing the use of BioShield’s limited
funds to buy such outdated vaccines).
10Worse yet, the stockpile contains only ﬁve million anthrax vaccines doses—enough for only two percent of
the population at best.49
Determining what exists in the national stockpile alongside the anthrax and smallpox vaccines is more
imprecise. According to testimony by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health, the stockpile contains coun-
termeasures necessary to protect and treat “millions of Americans” in the event of an anthrax, plague or
tularemia.50 Also stockpiled are countermeasures such as Prussian Blue and diethylenetriaminepentaacetate
(DTPA) that can address the eﬀects of radiation exposure, and potassium iodide, which can protect the
thyroid from some eﬀects of radioactive iodide. 51 Still, speciﬁcs as to how many scenarios such countermea-
sures could respond to—that is, how versatile or far-reaching in treatment the countermeasures are—and
exactly how many Americans could be treated with the current inventory remain uncertain.
To be sure, federal authorities have plans to expand the national stockpile in the near future. Health and
Human Services has begun the acquisition process for botulinum toxin, anthrax therapeutics, and the next
generation of smallpox vaccine.52 In addition, HHS awarded a $877 million contract to a small biotechnology
ﬁrm, VaxGen, for the next generation anthrax vaccine.53 While these steps are important, they represent
only the ﬁrst of many steps necessary to place the nation on the path towards a robust stockpile and strong
preparedness to avert a public health crisis in the event of bioterrorism.
49Id.
50One Year Later: Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Project BioShield: A Hearing before the House Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005) (statement of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary, Public Health Emergency).
51Id.
52One Year Later: Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Project BioShield: A Hearing before the House Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005) (statement by Dr. John Vitko, Director, Biological Countermeasures Portfolio, Science,
and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
53Richard Fisher, Lights, Camera, Action: Project Bioshield, New Scientist, p 54, June 4, 2005.
11B.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Congressional Stockpile and Countermeasures provisions
1. Strengths
Three main strengths characterize the national stockpile and countermeasure provisions in the Bioterrorism
Act and Project Bioshield. First, Congress created an agenda to develop a critical aspect of the nation’s
defense against bioterrorism. As is often heard: it is not a matter of if, but when, another terrorist will
strike. In the event of bioterrorist attacks, a national stockpile of countermeasures that will treat or vaccinate
potential victims could prevent or at least contain a serious public health crisis. Thus, setting the goal of
creating a national stockpile, as Congress did with the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, is imperative. Congress
went an important second step with Project Bioshield: recognizing that the creation of an adequate stockpile
depends on the availability of countermeasures not yet developed, Congress passed Project Bioshield to put
into place a framework conducive to the development of necessary countermeasures. As will be discussed
below, serious weaknesses within the legislation currently prevent the actualization of the laudable goals of
developing countermeasures and creating an adequate national stockpile, but nonetheless, setting the proper
agenda represents an important strength of the Bioterrorism Act and Project Bioshield that must not be
overlooked.
Second, the public-private partnership that emerges from Project Bioshield is arguably critical to the success
of Congress’s goals of developing and stocking countermeasures that will meet the needs of the nation in
the event of bioterrorist attacks. Congress’s attempt to foster a mutually beneﬁcial relationship with the
private sector potentially bodes well for the future of the stockpile. In a sense, Congress ﬂipped the normal
relationship between the government and the private sector upside down: normally the FDA fulﬁlls a “gate-
keeper” role in protecting the public from potentially dangerous medical drugs and products. This role led
12to a conservative FDA that engaged in time-consuming approval processes for products.54 With the passage
of both the Bioterrorism Act and Project Bioshield, the government now takes an active role in soliciting
private sector activity55 and expedites the approval process for critical countermeasures.56 Arguably, the
FDA’s conservatism with respect to countermeasure approvals has (or will) morphed into activism.57 While
one might argue that this potentially creates some conﬂicts of interest that could compromise safety, never-
theless, this private-public relationship articulated by Congress represents a willingness to pursue new and
ﬂexible means of achieving the twin goals of developing and stocking critical bioterrorist countermeasures.
Hopefully, Congress can make the appropriate adjustments in the future where obvious complications arise
that compromise safety, while remaining committed to a ﬂexible approach that pursues cooperation with
the private sector towards a common goal rather than antagonism and excessive conservatism.
The third strength of these Acts lies is simple: Congress committed $5.6 billion dollars to the development
and procurement of countermeasures for the stockpile over the next 10 years. To be sure, criticisms exist re-
garding the amount of funding (not enough)58 and the particular use of the $5.6 billion dollars,59 but the fact
still stands that Congress committed a substantial amount of money towards the development and procure-
ment of countermeasures. To the extent that allocation of funds provides the best indication that Congress
seriously prioritizes a particular project, this funding speaks volumes about the seriousness of Congress’s
54See James T. O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Eﬀects of Counter-Terrorism Pressures upon Medical Product
approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 338 (2004)(looking at changed incentives for manufacturers in wake of anthrax
scare, and how bio-terrorism threats changing FDA bureaucratic norms).
55Under Project Bioshield, the HHS Secretary can identify a necessary countermeasure not yet developed, submit a proposal
to develop this countermeasure for approval by the President, and then solicit development of this countermeasure by the private
sector. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
56See supra text accompanying notes 24-25, 36-37.
57See supra note 55, James T. O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Eﬀects of Counter-Terrorism Pressures upon
Medical Product approvals, at 338.
58With some estimates of the funds necessary to create an adequate shield against bioterrorism set at $50 billion, some could
argue the $5.6 billion funded in Project Bioshield is insuﬃcient. See Drug Problem: Biodef ense, ECONOMIST, April 24, 2004
(By most estimates, building the necessary biodefence, which includes 100 new diagnostics, vaccines and treatments, will take
at least 5-10 years and $50 billion).
59See One Year Later: Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Project BioShield: A Hearing before the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005)(comments by US Rep Henry Waxman (D-CA)(arguing that BioShield’s limited
funds should not be used to buy outdated anthrax vaccines, but to develop next generation ones; funds to buy the necessary
older anthrax vaccines should come from general public health funds).
13(and the President’s) commitment towards these developing and stocking critical bioterrorist countermea-
sures. It should be remembered that the Bioterrorism Act did not include such signiﬁcant funding; Project
Bioshield thus represents a deepening commitment of Congress and a step in the right direction.
2. Weaknesses
One can state simply the primary weakness of the Bioterrorist Act and Project Bioshield: they have failed to
achieve their stated purposes. The private sector is not jumping on board to develop critical countermeasures
as intended by Project Bioshield. In addition, even if the stockpile contained adequate supplies, state and
local governments are currently unprepared to receive and deliver necessary vaccines or other countermeasures
in the event of a real emergency triggered by bioterrorism.60
While Congress and other relevant authorities must focus on both problems, this section will not analyze
the state and local governments’ general lack of capacity to distribute stockpile contents. Much has already
been written on the topic61 and it arguably represents an independent, albeit related, issue. Instead, this
section will analyze the other major weakness of the current legislation: the private sector is not jumping on
board to develop critical countermeasures that the government can then procure for the national stockpile.
60See e.g. Mimi Hall, Cities fret over how to quickly deliver vaccines, USA TODAY, p 3A Aug. 1, 2005 (in 2004,
HHS devoted $27 million to 21-city program called the Cities Readiness Initiative because currently, the public health sys-
tem (state and local) constitutes “one of the weakest links in our national defense”); Jeﬀ Nesmith, U.S. gets poor grade
for terror prep, The Atlanta Journal Constitution, P 5A, December 7, 2005 (Panel of 20 public health experts conclude
that only 7 states are qualiﬁed to receive deliveries from the national strategic stockpile– Texas, Florida, Virginia, Missouri,
Louisiana, Illinois and Delaware). Cf. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited March 1, 2006)(“During the Federal re-
sponse to Katrina, four critical ﬂaws in our national preparedness became evident: Our processes for uniﬁed management of
the national response; command and control structures within the Federal government; knowledge of our preparedness plans;
and regional planning and coordination” at p. 52)
61See id; see also Lori L. Buchsbaum, The U.S. Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Need for a Stronger Legislative
Approach, 7 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 1 (2002)(to avoid worst case scenario, the nation must strengthen current state
and federal public health responses to bioterrorism); Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Health, House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and
Response, House Select Homeland Security Committee, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003).
14Multiple explanations exist for the private sector’s lack of enthusiasm. The experience of Hollis-Eden Phar-
maceuticals, a biotechnology ﬁrm seeking a government contract under Project Bioshield62 for an anti-
radiation drug, illustrates some of these explanations. Hollis-Eden spent $100 million to develop its drug63—
Nuemune—as a medical countermeasure against radiological weapons of mass destruction. 64 Hollis-Eden
and market watchers speculated that the government, under Project Bioshield, could buy as many as 10
million doses of Nuemune at $50 each, for a total contract worth $500 million.65 However, the government
instead issued a request for proposal (RFP) to acquire enough doses to treat only 100,000 civilian casual-
ties.66 With its hope for a lucrative government contract gone and its stock plunging, Hollis-Eden criticized
the government’s actions as sending a very negative signal to private companies interested in pursuing de-
velopment of countermeasures under Project Bioshield.67
Hollis-Eden’s experience demonstrates two key weaknesses of the current stockpile and development of coun-
termeasures legislation. First, Project Bioshield fails to create a guaranteed market for newly developing
countermeasures and vaccines—without a guaranteed market, companies such as Hollis-Eden may quickly
learn that the risk that a market will never materialize for their product (governments represent the only
customer for these products) greatly outweighs any potential proﬁt. Companies will not risk signiﬁcant sunk
costs but will instead continue to invest in drugs that treat chronic conditions such as hypertension, cancer
62Project Bioshield is not limited to development of countermeasures to bioterrorism. It encompasses countermeasures to
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. See Michelle Meadows, Project Bioshield: Protecting Americans from Ter-
rorism, FDA Consumer Magazine, Nov-Dec 2004, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/604 terror.html
(last visited on March 1, 2006).
63Mark Kaufman, New Worries on BioShield Eﬀort; Request for Medicines Called Too Small to Support Firms, WASH-
INGTON POST, p A21 (Oct 5, 2005).
64Even though this is an anti-radiation drug and not a bioterrorism countermeasure, the experience is instructive because
makers of bioterrorism-related vaccines and countermeasures face the same problems.
65Penni Crabtree, Hollis-Eden shares fall on limited drug order: Maker of anti-radiation treatment criticizes plan, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Oct. 1, 2005)
66Id.
67See Mark Kaufman, New Worries on BioShield Eﬀort: Request for Medicines Called Too Small to Support Firms, supra
note 64.
15and heart disease that promise guaranteed markets and proﬁts.68 Second, a lack of transparency in the
government procurement process means that companies must invest in the development of products without
any concrete guidance and advice from the government; this hinders companies from making eﬃcient and
informed choices about R&D. Pharmaceutical companies have testiﬁed before Congress seeking correction
of both ﬂaws.69
In addition to weaknesses relating to unsatisfactory government actions, current legislation fails to spur
private companies into developing critical countermeasures because Congress fails to fund development of a
product from proof of concept until procurement into the national strategic stockpile. Thus, pharmaceutical
companies speak of a “Valley of Death” that refers to the funding gap between the discovery of a promising
new product and the manufacturing, human safety and animal eﬃcacy studies.70 In addition, manufacturers
of products criticize the government for failing to assist in manufacturing process. They seek funding to
maintain a “warm base”—to keep a plant ready to begin manufacturing of a product (i.e. smallpox vaccine)
at a moment’s notice71—and to assist in the general upkeep of a plant to ensure it satisﬁes all regulatory
requirements. As the ﬂu vaccine shortage in 2004 demonstrated, only one or two manufacturers produce a
68One Year Later: Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Project BioShield: A Hearing before the House Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (July 14, 2005) (Statement of Gerald L. Epstein Senior Fellow, Science and Security Center for Strategic
and International Studies)(“These conditions provide large and continuing markets, whereas most infectious diseases occur only
sporadically, particularly in the developed world markets that can readily aﬀord pharmaceutical products. The required course
of anti- infective treatment lasts only a week or two - and if successful it clears up the problem, eliminating the need for further
business. Pharmaceutical manufacturers would rather devote their resources to drugs with larger and more lucrative markets
– and they would be punished by their investors if they didn’t”).
69Linking Bioterrorism Threats and Countermeasure Procurement before the Committee on House Homeland Security Sub-
committee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Cong. (July 12, 2005)(Statement of David P. Wright
President & CEO, PharmAthene, Inc)(discussing the need for more transparent government decisions regarding future contracts
for speciﬁc products); Hearing on Bioshield Act of 2003 before the House Government Reform Committee (April 4, 2003)(Pre-
pared statement of McKenna Long, Representative of Aventis Pasteur)(discussing the need for Congress to create guaranteed
markets for products and for returning the costs of capital and return on equity in the event of termination of a government
contract to buy products).
70Medical Countermeasures in Bioshield: Hearing before Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Subcommittee on
Public Health, June 9, 2005 (Statement of David P. Wright President and Chief Executive Oﬃcer, PharmAthene)(comparing
the Valley of Death gap in Project Bioshield with the DOD’s “Milestone B,” which funds the Valley of Death gap)
71Ross Kerber, Vaccine Makers Seek Funds to Stay Ready: They ask Government for help to keep plants primed in case of
bioterror attacks, BOSTON GLOBE, C1, May 6, 2005 (Acambis Inc. has delivered 182.5 million doses of smallpox vaccine to
the stockpile and seeks funding to maintain a “warm base”).
16given vaccine72 and any problems with a manufacturing plant (the contamination of a British plant caused
the ﬂu vaccine shortage in 2004) can cause a severe vaccine shortage.73 Thus, Project Bioshield’s failure to
create an all-encompassing vision of the funding process constitutes a serious weakness.
Finally, and most notably, the Bioterrorism Act and Project Bioshield fail to oﬀer both liability protections
for companies and compensation for adversely aﬀected patients. This creates two problems. First, companies
will not invest in such products as vaccines and countermeasures to bioterrorism carry serious unavoidable
risks. This explains one major reason Project Bioshield has failed to spur private companies to invest in
priority countermeasures and vaccines—the beneﬁts do not outweigh the almost certain risks.74 Second,
citizens will not avail themselves to available vaccines, such as smallpox, if a compensation scheme is not in
place. The smallpox vaccine program initiated by President Bush75 is instructive: roughly 40,000 received a
smallpox vaccine originally intended for 500,000 (less than 10 percent).76 Without any promise of compensa-
tion and restoration to pre-injury position, health care providers refused to receive the vaccination. Project
Bioshield’s failure to provide liability for companies and compensation for victims has received perhaps the
most public attention; indeed, legislation designed to ﬁx these ﬂaws is pending in Congress.77
In sum, three main weaknesses of the stockpile related provisions of Bioterrorism Act and Project Bioshield
stand out: the government’s ineﬃcient handling of the procurement process (lack of transparency and lack
of guaranteed markets); the government’s overly narrow vision of the funding process (ignores “Valley of
72See Gail H. Javitt, Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense: Reﬁning FDA Regulation to Promote the Availability
of Products to Counter Biological Attacks, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 37, 92-93 (2002)(only 1 manufacturer for
many vaccines; vaccines compromise only 1-2% of global sales).
73Jennifer Lee, Kerry Says U.S. Should Have Prepared for Flu Shot Shortage, NEW YORK TIMES, p 38, Oct 10, 2004)
74Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation
Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7 at 9 (Congress
must protect manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of the vaccine from liability and also compensate those injured by the
vaccination).
75Bush orders smallpox vaccine for military, for himself, CNN, Jan 30, 2004, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/12/13/bush.smallpox/ (last visited on March 1, 2006).
76Supra note 75 Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s Lackadaisical Liability and
Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7 at
8-9.
77See e.g. S. 975, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 3, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 666, 109th Cong. (2005)
17Death” and manufacturing issues); and Congress’s failure to provide liability protections and victim com-
pensation.
C.
Recommendations for Future Governmental Action
1. Liability and Compensation Provisions
Serious development of vaccines and countermeasures to bioterrorism will only occur if Congress extends
liability protections to companies investing in such products. Insurance is unlikely to cover companies that
develop and sell vaccines and countermeasures to bioterrorism, given the unavoidable risk such products
entail. With high returns assured in safer, more lucrative products, rational companies would not invest in
countermeasures and vaccines. Even though generic and name brand companies clash on many aspects of
“Bioshield II,” both agree that liability protection for companies is critical.78 Currently, the many competing
Bioshield II legislation pending in Congress include liability protections for companies.79
Compensation for persons injured from vaccines or countermeasures goes hand-in-hand with liability protec-
tions. Government should not leave victims without any recourse for injuries suﬀered, as potentially could
happen if liability protections were extended without compensation provisions. The small pox vaccination
ﬁasco discussed above proves instructive.80 Thus, Bioshield II legislation should extend compensation similar
to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Fund.81
78Ted Agres, Coaxing Pharma out of the Gate, Drug Discovery and Development, P 14, June 1, 2005.
79See supra note 77.
80See text accompanying supra notes 75-76.
81Supra note 75 Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s Lackadaisical Liability and
Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7 at
31-35 (arguing that costs are manageable: the government has awarded $ 629 million for 1,249 awards in NCVIA claims and
attorneys’ fees for childhood vaccine injuries since 1990 and nearly $ 7 billion for 5,000 families from the by Sept 11th fund).
182. Government articulation of concrete goals: transparency in procurement
As the above Hollis-Eden story illustrated, government must articulate clearly and early what countermea-
sures and vaccines the government seeks, and in what quantities. If not, and if more Hollis-Eden stories
abound, companies will shy away from an uncertain government market. Congress has arguably done its
part in articulating clearly the goals of creating a national stockpile and providing the necessary funding to
develop countermeasures; it is now up to the HHS and other relevant agencies to contribute to these ends by
creating a transparent procurement process that will provide information and insights to the private sector
necessary to structure appropriate investments in vaccines and countermeasures to bioterrorism. Numerous
representatives of pharmaceutical companies have begged for such transparency before Congress.82
3. Be creative in using incentives to encourage investment in the development of stockpile contents
Two bills currently pending in Congress typify the general strategy Congress seems prepared to take in con-
fronting the reality that companies are not investing in the development of much needed stockpile contents:
the bills assume that Congress must bribe the private sector into developing countermeasures and vaccines
with tax breaks and patent extensions. Thus, Senators Hatch and Lieberman’s “Bioshield II”83 bill oﬀers a
two-year “wildcard” extension on an unrelated patent to the company that develops necessary countermea-
sures or vaccines.84 Similarly, another Senate bill oﬀers an additional two-year market exclusivity for any
82See e.g., Linking Bioterrorism Threats and Countermeasure Procurement before the Committee on House Homeland Secu-
rity Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Cong. (July 12, 2005)(Statement of David P.
Wright President & CEO, PharmAthene, Inc)(government must identify its needs early enough for companies to make informed
decisions).
83The bills discussed are not actually titled “Bioshield II” but will be a shorthand characterization because nevertheless these
bills attempt to ﬁll the gaps left by the Project Bioshield of 2004.
84Ted Agres, Coaxing Pharma out of the Gate, DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT, P 14, June 1, 2005 (Hatch
and Lieberman, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons Countermeasures Research Act (S. 666), includes tax credits,
intellectual property incentives, and liability protections in addition to the wildcard exception).
19countermeasure developed, as a reward to the company who undertakes such investment.85
Such attempts to bribe the private sector with patent extensions or similar ﬁnancial incentives do not nec-
essarily represent the best strategy. It would be diﬃcult for Congress to determine the optimal amount
of ﬁnancial incentives necessary to induce companies to develop these countermeasures in the most eﬃcient
manner. If Congress oﬀers too few ﬁnancial incentives, companies still will not bite and much time and eﬀort
has been wasted by Congress. Indeed, it seems questionable at best if Congress could ever oﬀer enough incen-
tives to convince pharmaceutical companies to forgo investment in potential blockbusters that treat chronic
conditions and instead invest in vaccines and countermeasures that may be used for only a short period
of time, and that may be bought only by one customer—the U.S. government. If Congress could provide
suﬃcient bribes, one wonders whether such investment is the best use of the government’s limited resources.
Moreover, if Congress oﬀers too many incentives, such as overly generous patent extensions, competition
could actually be inhibited to the detriment of the contents critical for the National Strategic Stockpile.86
Instead of relying on a strategy of bribing, and accepting its attendant risks and uncertainties, the gov-
ernment should creatively expand its vision of development and procurement of products for the national
stockpile. The government should consider two alternative strategies in particular: ﬁrst, bring new players
into the research and development picture beyond the drug industry, namely, other countries who can ex-
pand the market available for these products, philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates
foundation, and universities who would be happy to accept continued funding for niche research centers.
Second, the government should leverage its resources against an uncooperative private market to force the
85Senators Gregg, Frist et al, Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of 2005 (S.3).
86See e.g. Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1
(2005)(arguing that proper incentives to develop strong biopharmaceutical products lie in curbing and limiting doctrine of
equivalents in patent system in predictable manner—not being overly generous towards patentees which will stiﬂe innovation
and competition).
20private sector to come up with its own creative strategies to balance the need for critical countermeasures to
bioterrorism with the need to turn a proﬁt. If the pharmaceutical industry feels threatened by government,
it may take the initiative to create solutions on its own, as has the food and cosmetic industry in the past.
Strategy #1: Bringing other players to the table: Bill and Melinda Gates have donated $31 billion to their
foundation, which primarily addresses global health problems.87 The funds from Gates’ foundation are
used to “overcome the market failure aﬄicting poor consumers of health care” and to supply much needed
medicines to poor consumers.88 The Gates are not alone: his example arguably has set oﬀ a ﬁrestorm of
philanthropic giving89 among the world’s 691 billionaires.90 Bringing philanthropists to the table could serve
two purposes: ﬁrst, philanthropic funds can be used to fund the development of vaccines and countermea-
sures. Government would not have to worry about calibrating the proper amount of incentives in bribing
pharmaceutical companies, as the philanthropic organizations could fund and ﬁnancially reward dedicated
scientists devoted to the cause of developing critical vaccines and countermeasures. Alternately, philan-
thropic funds could be used to ﬁnance any incentives necessary to encourage the private sector rather than
government funds. Either option serves the government eﬀectively in ensuring the development of products
crucial to the National Stockpile. Given that philanthropists generally use their foundations for much needed
social causes, publicity and national gratitude that would accompany the development and procurement of
contents for the Strategic Stockpile could be a strong selling point.
Beyond philanthropists, government should generally expand the market for critical countermeasures and
vaccines by cooperating with other countries towards a common goal. If all NATO allies provided a guaran-
teed market for vaccines and critical countermeasures to bioterrorism, it may oﬀer a solution to the reality
that pharmaceutical companies are hesitant to invest in products with uncertain and non-guaranteed mar-
87The Business of Giving, The Economist, Survey p 3, February 25, 2006.
88The Birth of philanthrocapitalism, The Economist, Survey p 10, February 25, 2006.
89To have and not to hold: The rise of the new philanthropist, The Economist, Survey p 5, February 25, 2006.
90The Business of Giving, The Economist, Survey p 3, February 25, 2006.
21kets. A comparison with bird ﬂu vaccines seems apt—with the whole world in potential need of such vaccines,
companies such as Solvay that produce such vaccines, should make good proﬁts from its global market.91
Coordination of governments towards multi-nation purchasing from one company could be a laudable goal
of Congress or the appropriate federal agency.
Finally, funding of academic centers devoted to the development of vaccines and countermeasures to bioter-
rorism that can be procured for the National Stockpile presents a potentially less costly means to secure
development without bankrupting the treasury. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) has already begun funding of “centers of regional excellence”—academic centers designed to focus
on the application of scientiﬁc knowledge through the development of priority countermeasures to bioter-
rorism.92 Harvard Medical School received one such award.93 The publicity such centers would generate
from the development of countermeasures or vaccines, in addition to the guaranteed government funding for
ongoing research, would provide suﬃcient reward and incentives for academic centers to pursue the research
the private sector currently refuses to pursue. The government should thus consider expanding such initia-
tives and deepening the cooperation between such centers. That is, government could condition its grants
on the mutual cooperation among such centers so that academic inﬁghting does not unnecessarily deter the
development of critical countermeasures and vaccines.
Strategy #2: Create incentives for private industry to create its own workable solutions: In truth, it seems
unlikely that the promise of proﬁt made oﬀ critical countermeasures and vaccines is suﬃcient to cause
companies to invest the necessary amounts to develop such products. The government should use its leverage
of carrots and sticks in a more creative way to force the industry to create its own solutions. Just as the
91See Andrew Jack, Europe Set to Buy up supplies of Flu Vaccines, Financial Times, March 2, 2006, available at
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/077f389c-aa1e-11da-96ea-0000779e2340,s01=1.html (last visited on March 4, 2006).
92Alison Motluk, Big spending on biodefence has given research into new vaccines and antivirals a massive shot in the arm,
NEW SCIENTIST, P 56, Oct. 23, 2004.)
93Id.
22food and cosmetic industries demonstrated that self-regulation is possible when the threat of government
intervention looms large,94 so, too, might the drug industry determine a means to create its own solution
to the need for the development of stockpile products. Using its soft power of carrots, government could
promise pharmaceutical a powerful publicity campaign on its behalf if the industry would create a common
board or pool of pro-bono scientists who would devote themselves to develop these critical countermeasures
and products. If the burden of such pro-bono work were spread around among companies, the costs could
be aﬀordable. The public’s cynical view of pharmaceutical companies might quickly alter in the face of such
positive publicity, and certain brand names associated with the pro-bono development of products for the
national defense could see a deﬁnite boost in consumer loyalty.
If it is too optimistic to hope for carrots to produce such outcomes, the government could leverage its
sticks against the industry. Instead of providing tax incentives to pharmaceutical companies as a form of
bribery, government could promise tax increases, shorter patent lives or anything else to essentially scare
the pharmaceutical industry into designing a method to stave oﬀ such government actions and to create a
pro-bono pool of scientists or funds to develop the necessary products. Again, if pharmaceutical companies
worked together on such an endeavor, the shared burden could create an aﬀordable solution to the current
reality that no company is developing the necessary products. The government could justify its threats based
on the seriousness of the need to develop critical countermeasures to bioterrorism—if individual companies
will not create the products, government will tax companies to raise the necessary funds to pay other scientists
to develop the countermeasures.
While the cultivation of an industry norm that certain products require a pro-bono commitment (similar to
94These industries self-regulate the approval of product ingredients through the creation of independent review boards such
as the Cosmetic Ingredient Review Panel, and the review organizations in the food industry such as the Food and Extract
Manufacturing Association (FEMA). Incentives in large part arise from a desire to keep government from further regulating the
industry. See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Cosmetics,
in Cosmetic Regulation in a Competitive Environment (Ed. by Norman Estrin and James Akerson)(2000), p 1-41 at 29
(no industry in U.S. more successful at self-regulation than cosmetic industry).
23the pro-bono hours worked by lawyers or doctors) seems a very good solution, it is only oﬀered as one of
many solutions the industry could create. The means is less important than the outcome—the development
of critical products that government can procure for the National Strategic Stockpile. If the proper carrots
(not pure ﬁnancial bribery) or sticks are utilized, the government could make the best use of its limited uses
by securing its desired outcome in the most cost-eﬃcient manner.
Part IV. Conclusion
The National Strategic Stockpile represents an important and laudable Congressional goal. Unfortunately,
the Stockpile’s success depends on the procurement of countermeasures and vaccines not yet created devel-
oped. In drafting legislation to ensure the development of these critical products, the government should take
a creative approach to designing incentives and strategies. Rather than rely solely on the same-old, same-old
methods of bribery, the government should include non-traditional actors such as philanthropists, foreign
governments, and academic centers in its plans. Moreover, the government should pander less to industry
and instead leverage its available sticks and carrots to compel the drug industry to accept the responsibility
of developing vaccines and countermeasures for the common good—rather than rely on government to write
the terms, government should assist industry in creating the necessary conditions for the private sector to
construct its own solutions to this need. In this way, the government can use its limited resources in the
most eﬀective and cost-eﬃcient manner.
Luckily, no bioterrorist attack has yet created a serious public health crisis. However, we cannot aﬀord to
continually rely on luck, but must instead take immediate steps to proactively and intelligently ensure the
build-up of a strong and robust Strategic National Stockpile.
24